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 Complex systems will, inevitably, experience failures.  The cause of these failures or mishaps may be 
labeled ‘operator error,’ but often they are actually caused by the confluence of technological, situational, 
individual, and organizational factors.  Several models and theories of human error have been proposed 
over the years and are reviewed in this paper.  The authors propose another model, the Dynamic Model of 
Situated Cognition (DMSC), to explain how complex systems fail.  Miller and Shattuck (2004) developed 
the DMSC in an effort to link technological aspects of a system to the perceptual and cognitive aspects of 
that system.  They illustrated the model by applying it to the USS Stark incident and to a military command 
and control simulation (Shattuck and Miller, 2004).  The model also appears to have utility as a 
retrospective explanatory tool to identify when and where things went wrong.  In this paper, the authors 
describe the DMSC as it relates to the analysis of error in complex systems and apply it to the February 
2001 mishap in which the U.S. Navy submarine USS Greeneville collided with the Japanese motor vessel 




 Complex cognitive systems will, inevitably, 
experience failures.  The proximate cause of these failures or 
mishaps are often labeled ‘operator error,’ but more often than 
not they are caused by the confluence of technological, 
situational, individual, and organizational factors.  Reason 
(1990; 1997) argues that complex systems have a series of 
defenses which are designed to prevent accidents from 
occurring.  Holes in these defenses are created by latent or 
active failures which set the conditions for a trajectory that can 
lead to mishaps. Other researchers have examined error in 
complex systems and have developed their own models of 
how and why accidents occur (Senders & Moray, 1991; 
Woods, Johannesen, Cook, & Sarter, 1994; Doerner, 1996; 
Snook, 2000; Strauch, 2002; Dekker, 2002).  
 Miller and Shattuck (2004) developed a Dynamic 
Model of Situated Cognition linking the technological aspects 
of a complex system to the perceptual and cognitive aspects of 
the system.  They illustrated the model by applying it to a 
military command and control simulation.  Data and 
information flowed (and sometimes were prevented from 
flowing) through the model resulting in decision makers’ 
understanding of the situation.  This model is not only useful 
for examining the flow of data and information as events 
unfold in a complex system, it also appears to have utility as a 
retrospective explanatory mechanism to identify when and 
where things go wrong.  This paper reviews approaches to 
explaining human error, presents further details on the 
Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition, and demonstrates how 
the model can be used to retrospectively account for mishaps. 
 Senders and Moray (1991) suggest that hardware 
failures can contribute either directly or indirectly to abnormal 
system states and that human error can be proximate or 
remote.  Their causal network for error analysis includes both 
technological (hardware) and human components but it is not 
clear how those components interact with one another as an 
event unfolds.  The authors propose that investigators 
construct a causal chain which begins at the point of failure 
and proceeds backward in time to events that might have 
contributed to the mishap. 
 Strauch (2002) reviews several of the leading theories 
of error in complex systems.  He states that “operator errors 
are the logical consequences of antecedents or precursors that 
had been present in the systems at the time they were 
committed” (p. 16).  The emphasis on system antecedents is a 
relatively recent phenomenon in the field of error 
investigation.  Antecedents hidden in the system are detected 
when they influence an operator’s performance.  Investigators 
have also expanded the scope of their analysis by broadening 
both what they consider to be the system and what they deem 
to be the relevant window of time.  Strauch lists six elements 
that comprise a system (after Moray, 1994, 2000), each more 
removed from the actual failure event than the preceding 
element: equipment; individual operator; multi-operator team; 
company and management; regulator; and, social and cultural 
factors. 
 Woods, et al. (1994) characterize a complex system 
as having a sharp end, where operators interact with 
technology, and a blunt end, which includes managers, 
designers, and administrators who are spatially and temporally 
distant from the operators.  They list fourteen premises of 
human error.  Included in their list are the following: 
• Erroneous actions and assessments are the start of the 
investigation, not the end. 
• Erroneous actions are a symptom, not a cause. 
• There is a loose coupling between process and outcome. 
• Incidents evolve through the conjunction of several 
failures/factors. 
• Some of the contributing factors to incidents are latent 
in the system. 
• Error tolerance, error detection, and error recovery are 
as important as error detection. 
• The design of artifacts affects the potential for 
erroneous actions and paths toward disaster. 
 Reason (1990; 1997) describes error in terms of a 
failure in a system’s defenses.  He postulates that a system 
may have multiple defenses, each of which may have holes in 
them due to either latent or active failures.  If the holes line up, 
it is possible for an error trajectory to pass through the system, 
which will result in an accident or mishap, hence the analogy 
of a ‘Swiss cheese’ model.  Reason describes a system as 
having three levels (the person, the workplace, and the 
organization).  Causality flows from the organization to the 
person; accident investigations typically flow from the person 
back to the organization. 
 Recent work by Wiegmann and Shappell (2003), 
based on Reason’s theoretical framework, focuses on a 
methodology for conducting aviation accident investigations. 
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
(HFACS) expands on Reason’s work by offering a taxonomic 
approach to classifying the nature of the holes in his ‘Swiss 
cheese’ model.  HFACS has received considerable attention in 
the military and civil aviation communities and has been 
recently adopted as an accident investigation tool by several of 
these US and international communities. 
 In general, the human error models described above 
consider systems to have distal and proximate elements.  
These models may also include both human and technological 
components.  Flaws in these models may lie dormant or go 
unnoticed until certain activities or precipitating events 
uncover them.  These models do not necessarily describe 
systems in a dynamic manner and they do not address how 
systems are designed to perform.  In Figure 1, the Dynamic 
Model of Situated Cognition (Miller and Shattuck, 2004) 
describes total human system performance, incorporating the 
notion that this process is dynamic, with feed-forward and 
feedback loops operating continuously. The authors have 
previously used the DMSC to illustrate design flaws and the 
flow of information in a system. In this paper, the authors 




Figure 1.  A Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition. 
 
TECHNOLOGICAL PORTION OF THE SYSTEM 
 
 The DMSC is applicable to virtually any domain in 
which technology and humans combine to accomplish a stated 
goal.  The authors, however, have chosen to explain and 
illustrate the model in a military command and control (C2) 
setting.  The large oval on the left side of the figure (Oval 1) 
depicts ground truth, i.e., everything in the world.  Ground 
truth is dynamic in nature, changing with spatial and temporal 
progression although it may be captured or frozen at points in 
time.  There is no error or uncertainty with respect to Oval 1.  
Simulations allow for the accurate representation of ground 
truth.  In the real world, however, it is understood that Oval 1 
cannot be measured with complete precision and accuracy.  
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The blue rectangles and red diamonds in Oval 1 represent 
individual data elements for friendly and enemy entities.  
While are other things are present in the world (e.g., 
noncombatants, weather, terrain, friendly and enemy intent), 
they have been excluded from the figure for simplification. 
 The next oval (Oval 2) shows the elements detected 
by the technological systems.  Note that this oval is depicted 
as a subset of the first oval.  However, it is not apparent what 
portions of ground truth are being detected and what items 
remain undetected.  Error or uncertainty can first enter the 
model at Oval 2, taking various forms.  Oval 2 is a subset of 
Oval 1 for a variety of reasons. 
• Not enough sensors available to cover environment. 
• Sensors unable to detect due to lack of sensitivity or 
specificity. 
• Enemy activity designed to deceive (spoofing). 
• Sensors may malfunction. 
As in subsequent sections of the model, inaccuracy or 
uncertainty in Oval 2 can result in error which may be 
propagated throughout the rest of the model. 
 Oval 3 depicts what is displayed on the decision 
maker’s workstation. Again, these data are a subset of what is 
represented in Oval 2.  Users are able to tailor their displays to 
suit their individual preferences. If the user has the display 
settings adjusted on the C2 screens such that information is 
not displayed, it is possible that important, perhaps vital, 
information may be hidden or concealed.  It may not be 
obvious to the user which data have been excluded. Oval 3 
represents yet another entry point for error or uncertainty into 
the model. 
 
HUMAN PORTION OF THE SYSTEM 
 
 Three distinct lenses are depicted in Figure 1. Each 
individual enters a situation with a unique set of lenses. In a 
military context, the lenses may be thought of as shaped by the 
following categories: individual traits or characteristics, states 
or performance characteristics (system, team and individual), 
experience (societal, cultural and individual), and doctrine and 
rules of engagement (macro level - the context in the months 
preceding the incident; micro level - the context in the days 
and hours preceding the incident).  Together, these classes of 
information influence what is perceived by the user or 
decision maker and they represent potentially significant 
sources of error. 
 Oval 4 represents all the data actually perceived by 
the decision maker.  Perceived data in Oval 4 are a subset of 
the data available in the environment, the sensor array, the 
configuration of the local C2 display, and are based on the 
characteristics of the lens.  In addition, information in Oval 4 
can be received from other humans, represented by the three 
figures between Oval 3 and Lens A. These humans can 
contribute their perceptions, comprehensions or projections. 
 Perceived data are of little value to the decision 
maker until they are processed. The same lens components 
that directed attention and led to perception also influence 
comprehension.  The friendly and enemy icons in Oval 5 have 
been linked and reorganized, suggesting that they have been 
processed, representing the comprehension of the data 
elements that were perceived.  The oval is embedded in an 
amorphous shape, suggesting that there are other possible 
ways the data could be linked and reorganized that would lead 
to alternative mental representations of the data. 
 The final oval (Oval 6) represents the projection into 
the future or the prediction of the user.  Alternate views of the 
battlefield within the amorphous shape but outside of Oval 5 
do not contribute to or influence the prediction of the decision 
maker.  Note that the amorphous shape that surrounds Oval 6 
is larger than that which surrounds Oval 5 and contains even 
more alternatives.  This representation depicts the idea that 
there is much greater uncertainty associated with prediction. 
 Thus far, the DMSC has been described as a 
relatively linear process starting in Oval 1 and progressing 
through Oval 6 but that is far from accurate.  There are 
feedback loops to previous Ovals and Lenses in the DMSC 
that are intrinsic to its dynamic nature. To illustrate how 
feedback loops may influence the information flow process, a 
projection (Oval 6) could lead the decision maker to alter 
speed or trajectory (thereby changing Oval 1), modify the 
sensor coverage (Oval 2) or a local C2 display (Oval 3), 
influence perception of data (Oval 4), or influence 
comprehension of data (Oval 5).  Moreover, both projection 
(Oval 6) and comprehension (Oval 5) can shape the contents 
and contours of the decision maker’s lenses (A, B, and C). 
Error may be inected into the system through any of these 
feedback loops. 
 
APPLICATION OF THE MODEL 
 
 To demonstrate the utility of the DMSC, we examine 
an actual submarine command and control mishap on the USS 
Greeneville, using a process tracing methodology to pinpoint 
where and when the errors occurred, leading to the mishap.  
This analysis offers an example of how the DMSC can be used 
to determine how errors enter a system and are then 
propagated through it.  
 On February 9, 2001, the U.S. Navy submarine USS 
Greeneville collided with the Japanese motor vessel Ehime 
Maru off the coast of Oahu, Hawaii.  (See Figure 2 for an 
organizational chart of the personnel directly involved in the 
C2 process and in this incident.)  The submarine was 
demonstrating an emergency surfacing maneuver for civilian 
guests onboard for a seven-hour distinguished visitor cruise.  
As it rose to the surface, the submarine struck the fishing 
vessel’s aft port quarter, causing the ship to sink in less than 
10 minutes.  Of the 35 Japanese crew, instructors, and students 
onboard the Ehime Maru, 26 were rescued while nine remain 
unaccounted for, presumed dead (Executive Summary of USS 
Greeneville collision, retrieved 04/14/2005 from 
http://www.cpf.navy.mil/greeneville.html). 
 For the purposes of the DMSC application, the 
following sources of error, while far from exhaustive, will be 
used: 
• Submarine is behind schedule. 
• Equipment failure. 
• CO is overconfident; influences lenses of crew. 
• FTOW manually overrides and enters incorrect 
surface contact solution data. 
 One of the decisions made by the CO was to prepare 
to come to periscope depth.  Mandatory procedures for a 
submarine to come to periscope depth (PD) require that the 
Officer of the Deck (OOD) hold a periscope briefing with 
watchstanders, conduct two good target motion analysis 
(TMA) legs of about three minutes on each surface contact, 
provide the necessary report and obtain the CO’s permission 
to proceed to PD.  These procedures were known to all 
crewmen and were part of their lenses. The CO, however, 
abbreviated these procedures used by the crew to maintain 
their SA during the PD maneuver. 
 
Submarine Behind Schedule 
 
 The problems started when the submarine fell behind 
schedule by 30 minutes and had less than an hour to get to a 
pre-designated location.  At this point, the commanding 
officer (CO) of the USS Greeneville made a series of decisions 
and issued orders that created an artificial sense of urgency in 
crewmembers in the control room.  This elevated time 
pressure affected the individual lenses (Lens A, B and C on 
the right side of the model) of the crewmembers, adversely 
impacting their ability to accurately process the information 
residing in Oval 4 though Oval 6 (perception, comprehension, 





of the Deck 
 
 
Figure 2.  Partial organizational chart for the USS Greeneville. 
 
 The CO’s decision not only compromised the 
procedures, it generated feedback loops to other portions of 
the system which virtually assured the data in the environment 
(Oval 1) which were detected by the sensors (Oval 2) were 
inaccurate or incomplete.  Hence, the data displayed on the C2 
workstations (Oval 3) were also inconsistent with Oval 1; and 
the perception, comprehension, and projection (Ovals 4, 5, and 
6) of the crewmembers with regard to the surface contacts 




 The information on the closing rate of the Ehime 
Maru was not in Oval 3 (data available on the C2 system) 
because a critical display system was not working.  The 
Analog Video Signal Display Unit (AVSDU), located in the 
control room of the submarine where it provides a remote 
display of sonar data used for surface contact analysis, was 
inoperative.  Since information on the proximity of the Ehime 
Maru was not available in Oval 3 from the AVSDU, it could 
not be propagated throughout the rest of the model.  Hence, 
errors may arise either because erroneous data propagate 
through a system or because data fail to propagate through a 
system. 
 
Overconfidence of CO 
 
 There were three surface ships in the vicinity of the 
submarine.  Data on two of the surface contacts, including the 
Ehime Maru, resided in both Oval 1 (ground truth or data in 
the environment) and in Oval 2 (data detected by sensors) of 
the DMSC.  The third contact was only in Oval 1.  The Ehime 
Maru was closing on the USS Greeneville but at this point this 
information only was available in Oval 1 and Oval 2.  Prior to 
the CO’s decision to surface, the sonar technician reported a 
new contact to the control team.  The third surface contact in 
Oval 1 had just been detected by the sensors (Oval 2) and was 
now displayed on the sonar technician’s workstation (Oval 3).  
Although the sonar technician had announced the new contact, 
this information either did not pass through Lens A in the 
model or was skewed as it passed through.  The result was that 
neither the CO nor the OOD perceived (Oval 4) the situation 
properly; they did not recognize that the sonar report was 
information on a new contact. 
 The CO then announced to Control that he had a 
good feel for the contact picture and ordered the OOD to 
proceed to PD on the same course.  The OOD was not given 
enough time to develop an accurate picture of the surface 
contact situation.  He did not conduct the required periscope 
brief with watchstanders, missing a valuable opportunity to 
receive and critically assess important contact information 
from the sonar tech.  He was deprived of input from both the 
technological agents and the human agents in the system. 
 Additionally, other crewmembers were not given 
enough time to do their jobs properly.  Upon hearing the sonar 
technician’s report of the new contact, the FTOW (fire control 
technician of the watch) rushed to complete his analysis of 
three surface contacts prior to PD, overlooking an updated 
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fated Ehime Maru).  His focus was entirely on a ’new‘ contact 
which he considered to be the primary contact of interest.  The 
FTOW’s lens was skewed by the false sense of urgency 
established by the CO which could very well have narrowed 
the FTOW’s focus of attention.  Further, when the FTOW 
heard the CO say he had a good feel for the contact picture, he 
assumed the CO was referring to all contacts, including the 
new one.  This provides further evidence of a skewed lens on 
the part of the FTOW, which may have contributed to his 
decision to remain silent, failing to provide the CO with 
corrective information. 
 The CO’s erroneous perception led to an incorrect 
comprehension (Oval 5) of the situation and an inaccurate 
projection (Oval 6) of where the vessels would be in the 
future.  At no time did the CO discuss the surface picture with 
the contact management team to verify a common 
understanding of the surface contacts (Ovals 5 and 6, 
comprehension and projection).  His own SA of contacts was 
based on two brief walk-throughs of the sonar room and a 
single review of fire control displays.  He was overly 
confident, pressed for time, and failed to properly use both the 
technological agents and the human agents in the system to 
build his understanding of the surface picture. 
 The decision to proceed to PD represents a feedback 
loop from Oval 6 (projection) to Oval 1 (environment).  As the 
submarine ascended to PD, the contents of Oval 1 were 
changed and new data were available for propagation through 
the model. 
 While at PD, the CO decided to interrupt the OOD’s 
periscope search and performed his own abbreviated visual 
search for surface contacts.  After the periscope searches by 
the OOD and CO, the FTOW cycled back through his surface 
contacts and correctly calculated a dangerous closing solution 
for one of the contacts, the Ehime Maru.  However, the OOD 
had just stated he had seen no close contacts at PD, and the 
CO also said he had no visual contacts.  These 
pronouncements so skewed the lens of the FTOW that he 
doubted his comprehension (Oval 5) of the situation (that there 
was a surface contact in close proximity to the submarine). 
 
Actions of the FTOW 
 
 The FTOW’s erroneous comprehension generated a 
decision and a feedback loop from Oval 5 (comprehension) to 
Oval 3 (C2 workstation).  He manually overrode the correct 
solution presented by his workstation, electronically changing 
the distance of the surface contact (Ehime Maru) from 4000 to 
9000 yards, reflecting the distance to the visual horizon.  The 
FTOW entered this erroneous information into the fire control 
system.  The result of this action created an impossible speed 
solution of 99 knots. After the periscope searches, the boat 
went “emergency deep,” proceeded to 400 feet, and conducted 
an emergency main ballast tank blow.  The ship surfaced 
underneath the Ehime Maru, causing major flooding on that 




 We have described various models of human error 
and proposed the Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition as 
another way to represent how decisions and events can 
propagate through a system.  We believe the DMSC shows 
promise because it not only illustrates the linkages between 
technology and human agents but does so at a level and in a 
manner that gives investigators, researchers, and designers the 
ability to trace data through the system.  We applied the 
DMSC by reviewing a recent submarine mishap involving the 
USS Greeneville.  Analysis of this case revealed that the 
technological (e.g., sensor coverage and workstation display) 
and perceptual/cognitive (e.g., perception, comprehension, and 
projection) systems, along with the unique and evolving 
contents of the crewmembers’ lenses, all played an important 
role in the unfolding of events.  Error was injected at various 
critical stages and was propagated throughout the model to its 
ultimately disastrous ending. 
 This analysis, along with previous extensions of the 
model to the USS Stark (FFG 31) mishap (Shattuck & Miller 
2004), support the utility of an approach which integrates 
technological and human agents.  This human - systems 
performance approach can inform system designers about 
weaknesses or vulnerabilities in a current or planned system 
and give them data they need to make modifications to the 
design, which, in turn will result in better systems and reduced 
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